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Research has repeatedly shown that altruism is lower in diverse communities.  Can this phenomenon
be counteracted by government intervention? To answer this question, this paper introduces diversity
to the canonical model of "warm glow" giving.  Diversity may have two effects on incentives: it may
attenuate individuals' altruistic preferences for public goods, and it may "cool off" the warm glow
that individuals get from voluntarism.  Either of these effects leads to diverse communities having
lower levels of public goods, consistent with prior research.  However, these effects have opposite
implications for the efficacy of government intervention. I then empirically investigate whether government
intervention is more effective in diverse communities.  For identification, I exploit the Supreme Court-
mandated 1991 expansion of the SSI program.  Using a new dataset of United Methodist churches
from 1984 to 2000, the results show that the expansion of SSI crowded-out charitable spending by
churches.  The crowd-out estimate for the average church is reasonably large, but this masks significant
differences in crowd-out between communities.  Crowd-out occurred almost entirely in relatively homogeneous
communities; there is only modest evidence of crowd-out in racially diverse communities. Thus diverse
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Research has repeatedly shown that altruistic behavior is lower in diverse communities.  Diversity 
has been associated with individuals contributing less to educational institutions (Miguel and Gugerty, 
2005), becoming less charitably generous (Hungerman, 2007), favoring income redistribution less 
(Luttmer, 2001), supporting the government less (Vigdor, 2004; Macculloch, 2005), and volunteering and 
participating in community organizations less (Costa and Kahn, 2003a, 2003b; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000, Okten and Osili, 2004).  But while most studies agree that diversity lowers altruistic activities, 
these studies shed little light on positive questions of whether diversity might also impact the efficacy of 
government intervention. In this paper, I explore the relationship between diversity and public good 
provision.  The focus is not on how diversity impacts the decisions made by the government, which has 
been amply studied.  Instead, the focus is on how diversity impacts whether decisions made by the 
government are negated by crowd-out.   
Such a focus may improve researchers’ understanding of crowd-out itself.  As discussed in the 
next section, the crowd-out literature has produced a wide array of empirical estimates. Yet excepting the 
well-known paper by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), researchers have not attempted to address the lack of 
empirical consensus in this literature.  This paper will explore whether community characteristics can 
help explain variation in crowd-out estimates.  The characteristic emphasized here—diversity—makes a 
good starting point both because of its salient place in the literature and because it may explain divergent 
crowd-out estimates in situations where Ribar and Wilhelm’s model cannot.  
  I begin by generalizing the canonical model of altruism, the warm glow model.  The model 
considers the voluntary provision of a public good and posits that two forces may influence provision of 
the good.  First, individuals may voluntarily contribute to a public good because they value the public 
good and want more of it—that is, individuals are motivated by “pure altruism.”  Second, individuals may 
contribute to a public good not because they care about the level of the public good but because they care 
about contributions per se; this is known as the “warm glow” incentive for contributions.   2
I generalize the model by allowing diversity to influence preferences for voluntary behavior 
through either of these channels.  First, diversity may attenuate purely altruistic motivations to contribute 
to the public good:  as a community grows more diverse, individuals may care less about how much of 
the public good is provided for everyone.  Second, diversity may “cool off” an individual’s warm glow.  
For instance, if an individual’s warm glow is driven by the desire for reputation or status, then as the 
community becomes more diverse the individual cares less about what others think of him, and the warm 
glow is consequently cooled off.   
Either of these two effects leads to diverse communities having lower levels of public goods.  
However, the effects have opposite implications for the efficacy of government intervention.  If the first 
effect dominates, so that diversity works by attenuating purely altruistic incentives, then in diverse 
communities people will only give because of a warm glow.  In this case, diverse communities have the 
lowest levels of public goods but they nonetheless are the most amenable to government intervention; 
people in diverse communities will be unwilling to substitute government donations for their own and 
crowd-out will be small.  If the second effect dominates, then in diverse communities the warm glow 
incentive has “turned cold” and individuals only give for altruistic reasons.  In this case government 
intervention will be particularly ineffective in diverse communities. 
I then empirically investigate the efficacy of government intervention in diverse communities 
relative to other communities.  Of course, unobserved phenomena may impact both government 
intervention and voluntarism, complicating empirical studies of crowd-out.  I overcome this issue by 
exploiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 expansion of the Supplemental Security Income program for 
children, a large and plausibly exogenous instance of government intervention in a major means-tested 
program. Importantly, there is significant variation in the intensity of this intervention across both 
homogeneous and diverse communities.  I know of no other research which has examined the crowd-out 
implications of this large program expansion.  There are a number of caveats to consider when using this 
policy expansion; they are discussed more in section 4.   3
To see how the court ruling impacts charitable contributions, I use a dataset of charitable 
activities undertaken by churches in the United Methodist denomination, one of the largest denominations 
in the country. The dataset contains church-level information on over 20,000 churches each year from 
1984 to 2000.  The data contain information on each church’s county of residence, allowing each church’s 
charitable activities to be compared with local government spending. This dataset has not been used in 
prior academic research. 
The results show that the rise in SSI spending following the 1991 court ruling crowded-out 
charitable spending by churches. Similar to Hungerman (2005), the results are reasonably large in size; 
extrapolating the estimate to other denominations, the results suggest that a one-dollar rise in SSI 
spending in the early 1990s crowded-out about 15 cents of church spending.  However, this crowd-out 
occurred almost entirely in communities that were relatively racially homogeneous.  There is only modest 
evidence of crowd-out in racially diverse communities; in many specifications the results cannot reject the 
hypothesis that crowd-out in diverse communities is zero.  
  These findings provide strong evidence that crowd-out can vary across different communities.  
This fact may have implications for prior empirical estimates of crowd-out, but it also raises important 
welfare issues.  Most empirical work in crowd-out has focused on questions of efficiency; these results 
indicate that the welfare consequences of crowd-out involve issues of equity as well.  The results here 
might also have implications for research in areas related to crowd-out, particularly work on the flypaper 
effect.  These implications are discussed more in the conclusions. 
The next section discusses past work on crowd-out and on diversity.  Section 3 lays out the 
model.  Section 4 describes SSI’s expansion, and presents data and results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Relation to Past Work 
2A. Crowd-out  
Despite significant improvements in empirical methodology, in recent years the crowd-out 
literature has produced a variety of estimates of government crowd-out on various altruistic behaviors.     4
Almost no work has tried to explain this empirical variation.   One exception is the well-known paper by 
Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) which points out that differences in observable characteristics across 
communities may help explain differences in crowd-out estimates.  The focus of their paper is community 
size.  They show, under certain conditions, that as the population in a community grows the warm glow 
will come to dominate altruistic incentives to give. Crowd-out in small communities may consequently 
look different from crowd-out in large communities.  
  The paper’s insight is certainly useful, but it fails to address the fact that divergent estimates of 
crowd-out persist even among studies where the relevant community sizes are comparably large (cf. 
Payne, 1998; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Saunders, 2005; Straub and Manzoor, 2005; Hungerman, 2005; 
Gruber and Hungerman, 2007).  To be sure, some of the discrepancy in the estimates of these studies is 
likely due to these papers considering crowd-out in different sectors. But even when looking at similar 
sectors, significantly different estimates can be found (e.g., Hungerman 2005; and Gruber and 
Hungerman, 2007; Kingma, 1989, Straub and Manzoor, 2005).  This raises the question of whether 
environmental factors beyond community size may affect crowd-out. 
2B. Diversity 
Perhaps the foremost environmental factor to consider is community diversity.  A large literature 
has considered how diversity may affect the level of public goods in a community.  Many of the papers in 
this literature follow the vanguard study by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) which argues that 
polarized preferences for public goods can lead to lower support by the median voter for public good 
provision.  Subsequent studies have explored how diversity may impact public good provision through a 
variety of public institutions (for example, Poterba, 1997, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; and Alesina, 
Baqir, and Hoxby, 2004).  These studies essentially examine how diversity impacts government 
decisions, but have little to say about situations when goods are jointly provided.   
The focus here will be on how diversity impacts whether decisions made by the government are 
negated by crowd-out.  The focus is consequently on altruistic activities, or more specifically on activities 
that may be jointly provided by both individuals and the government.  Such activities have received   5
empirical attention in for example Fong (2006), Fong and Luttmer (2006), Hungerman (2007), Luttmer 
(2001), Okten and Osili (2004), Vigdor (2004) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000).  But this body of work 
has little to say on whether diversity may affect the efficacy of government intervention.  This paper thus 
focuses on an important aspect of altruism and diversity—policy implications related to government 
intervention—overlooked by prior research. 
 
3.  Model 
  The model below explores diversity’s impact on the level of jointly provided public goods and on 
the net efficacy of government provision of such goods.  Before presenting the model, a few preliminary 
comments are in order.  
First, the introduction of a warm glow is a somewhat “reduced form” specification of preferences 
and it invites multiple interpretations for how diversity may influence decisions.  Here, the point of the 
model is not to isolate a specific mechanism by which diversity affects giving, but rather to highlight a 
broad ambiguity in how diversity affects government intervention.  If diversity primarily attenuates 
altruistic tastes for a public good, then diverse communities may be relatively amenable to intervention.   
If diversity primarily attenuates the value of giving per se, which may occur for any number of reasons, 
then diverse communities will be the least amenable to intervention. 
While the warm glow-based preference relation may be motivated by a number of different 
scenarios, some of these scenarios are certainly amenable to letting warm glow depend upon social 
context.  For example, Hollander (1990) suggests people give in part to obtain “social approval,” 
Harbaugh (1998a, 1998b) suggests that “prestige” may motivate giving, Glazer and Konrad (1996) refer 
to “status” as a motivator, and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) argue that reputational concerns may influence 
giving.  The model follows Romano and Yildirim’s (2001) observation that giving where a voluntary 
donation is itself valuable and depends upon social circumstances may be represented as warm glow.   
Second, the model introduces diversity to the canonical warm-glow model by supposing that 
members of a community live on a unidimensional line, and that the distance between person i’s location   6
on the line and the average community member’s location on the line affects i’s preferences.  The idea 
that individuals are sensitive to the average community member’s characteristics seems reasonable in 
light of work showing that the average characteristics of community members play a salient role in 
determining altruistic behavior. Laboratory experiments (e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996; Eckel 
and Grossman, 1996; Fong and Lutmer, 2006) show that perceptions of public-good recipients affect 
altruism, and that an increase in the “social distance” between an individual and charitable recipients 
leads to lower levels of altruism.  As discussed in Section 2, work in non-experimental settings suggests 
that individuals are sensitive to the characteristics of the local population when undertaking voluntarism.  
The model here captures this notion in a straightforward way by allowing individuals’ decisions to donate 
to the public good to depend upon their perception of the typical community member.  Furthermore, while 
the past research suggests that diversity is a community characteristic likely to affect giving, it should be 
clear that the model’s implications could extend to essentially any characteristic that impacts incentives to 
give.  This is discussed more in the conclusion. 
Third, analyses of models of impure altruism often require strong assumptions on preferences.  
Results are oftentimes derived by appealing to quasi-linear preferences (Cornes and Sandler, 1994, 1999) 
or by imposing restrictions which ensure that the utility function’s cross-partials with respect to the level 
of the public good are zero (Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002).
1  Fortunately, such strong assumptions on the 
cross-partials of utility will not be necessary in what follows. 
Finally, as with virtually all crowd-out theory, government intervention in the model is 
exogenous.  Such a stylization is often reasonable in situations where goods are provided by the 
government and by individual altruism.  For example, in the empirical section I focus on the response of 
churchgoers to an intervention mandated by the Supreme Court, an intervention which may be argued to 
be exogenous.  Extending the model to strategic government intervention is left for future research. 
3A.  Basic Setup 
                                                 
1 The restriction in Ribar and Wilhelm’s model can be seen from Lemma 3 in the appendix of their paper.   7
Consider a model of impure altruism where there are n individuals in a community.  Individual i’s 
utility is derived from consuming a purely private good i c , the level of a public good Y  provided in the 
community, and from i’s own voluntary donation to the public good,  i g .   
Following the canonical model of community diversity introduced by Alesina, Baqir, and 
Easterly (1999) suppose that individuals in this community are located along a unidimensional line.   
When individuals decide how much to contribute to the public good, they take the characteristics of the 
typical beneficiary (that is, the typical community member) into account.  In particular, individuals are 
influenced by the distance between their location on the line and the average community member’s 
location on the line.  Let  0 i δ ≥  represent the distance between individual i and the average individual. 
The utility of individual i in the community is represented by  
  (,, ,) ii ii UU c Y g δ =  (1) 
where the function  i U  is strictly quasi-concave and increasing in  ,, i cYand i g  (we will not make any 
assumptions about the first-order impact of  i δ  on utility).   
 Individual  i is endowed with income  i ω  and pays lump sum taxes  i τ , where  ii τ ω ≤ .  A simple 
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= =∑ .  The individual’s budget constraint is 
  . ii i i cgω τ + =− (2) 
Defining  ij j ji Yg τ − ≠ =+ ∑ , we can add  i Y−  to both sides of (2) and rearrange terms to get: 
  iii cY Y ω − = +− . (3) 
Similarly,  ii i gY Yτ − =− −.  Using this and the expression in (3), under a Nash Equilibrium the 
individual’s maximization problem becomes  
  max ( , , , ) ii i i i i Y U U Y YYY Y ω τδ −− =+ − − − (4)   8
where  ,,, ii i Y ω τ −  and  i δ are all taken as given.  The first-order condition for this problem is  
  ic iY ig UUU = +  (5) 
where  ic U  is the derivative of  i U  with respect to c, and similarly for  iY U  and  ig U . This implicitly 
defines an optimal level of the public good for person i, 
* (,, ) ii i i i i Yf Y Y ω τδ −− =+ +.
2  Person i’s 
voluntary donation may be expressed as 
* (,, ) ii ii i i i i i gf Y Y Y ω τδ τ −− − = ++ − − . We assume f is 
continuous and differentiable in all its arguments, and that 
* 0 i g >  so that the individual will donate at 
least a small amount to the public good in equilibrium. These assumptions are reasonable, but play a role 
in the analysis.  They are discussed more below. 
  A number of properties of f are well known.  Normality of all goods ensures that the partial 
derivative of  i f  with respect to its first argument, denoted  ia f , is between zero and unity.
3  As discussed 
in Andreoni (1989), the warm glow condition ensures that if a dollar is taken from i’s income and used to 
increase  i Y− , then  i g will fall by less than a dollar; this leads to the partial derivative of  i f  with respect to 
its second argument, denoted  ie f , being positive.  If one assumes that there is no “crowd in”—that is, a 
one-dollar increase in  i Y−  leads to a less-than-one-dollar increase in 
* Y —it follows that  1 ia ie ff +<  and 
furthermore that  1 ie f < . 
3B. Diversity 
  Consider a mean-preserving spread of the location of individuals in the community, so that  i δ  
has weakly increased for all individuals.  In such a situation, we say the community has become more 
diverse. We will be interested in how diversity impacts individuals’ marginal propensity to donate 
                                                 
2 We thus assume interior solutions in the equilibrium, although we show below that the results where some 
individuals are at corner solutions are qualitatively similar.  
3 As in Andreoni (1989), the derivative of f with respect to its first argument is denoted  ia f because the first 
argument of f captures altruistic preferences for the public good.  The derivative with respect to the second argument 
is denoted  ie f  because the second argument comes from egoistic (or warm-glow) preferences.   9
disposable income to the public good. Consider an increase in an individual’s disposable income,  ii ω τ − , 
holding  i Y−  constant.  Disposable income grows if endowed income  i ω  increases or if the tax  i τ  falls.   
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.  A reduction in  i τ  may be viewed 
differently by the individual than an increase in  i ω  because the former also leads to a decline in the 
government’s provision of the public good.  In the extreme case of pure altruism, if the government 
reduces  i τ  by one dollar, individual i will simply take the extra dollar of disposable income and 
contribute it to the public good to maintain equilibrium, and there will be no  change in f at all.  With a 
warm glow, however, the tax cut is partly viewed by the individual as increasing income. In the extreme 
case where individuals give only because of a warm glow, individual i will respond to a tax cut in exactly 
the same manner as an increase in endowed income, and 1 ie ia f f − = .  Notice here that any change which 
leads to an increase in  ia f  will therefore lead to a decrease in  ie f . 
  We will assume that individuals’ marginal propensity to donate disposable income to the public 
good declines as diversity grows.  Thus, as endowed incomes rise we assume the corresponding increase 
in the donations is smaller in more diverse communities.  And if taxes fall, the resulting increase in 
voluntary donations to the public good is smaller in more diverse communities.  The following 
assumption encapsulates these two effects: 
Assumption 1:  The marginal propensity to donate disposable income towards the public good is lower 
in more diverse communities. That is, 1( , , ) ie i fa e δ − 1( , , ) ie i fa e δ′ >−  and  (,, ) (,, ) ia i ia i fa e fa e δ δ′ > , 
where  ii δ δ ′> . 
The assumption that 1( , , ) ie i fa e δ − 1( , , ) ie i fa e δ′ >−  may be considered an assumption on the 
impact diversity has upon warm-glow preferences.  Essentially, the marginal value of spending a dollar   10
on the warm glow is falling as diversity rises.  To see this, take the extreme case and suppose people only 
give because of the warm glow.  If the government cuts taxes, the individual views this as an increase in 
income and he may spend some of this tax cut on the warm glow.  As diversity grows, the marginal value 













, will fall, or equivalently  ie f  will increase.  An increase in  ie f  here is thus 
consistent with a “cooling off” of the warm glow.  This would be the case where an individual gives 
because he likes to be perceived as generous, but as diversity grows the individual cares less about his 
reputation in the community.  
The first inequality in Assumption 1 is relevant only in a model of impure altruism.  However the 
second assumption, that   (,, ) (,, ) ia i ia i fa e fa e δ δ′ > leads to diversity impacting the public good even if 
there is no warm glow at all.  As diversity increases, the individual’s marginal valuation of the level of 
public good in the community falls.  Thus if income rises, in a more diverse community the individual 
will devote a larger share of the new income towards private consumption.
4 This would be the case where 
an individual gives (for instance) to charities for the poor because the individual wants there to be less 
poverty.  But as the community grows diverse, the individual cares less about alleviating poverty, and the 
individual’s marginal propensity to donate income towards fighting poverty is reduced. 
Generally, it is not possible to use the sign of a cross-partial derivative to obtain the sign of a first 
derivative.  In this case, however, it turns out that either of the inequalities given in Assumption 1 are 
sufficient to sign  i f δ .   
Lemma 1:  Each inequality in Assumption 1 implies that  0 i f δ < . 
All proofs are given in the appendix.  Figure 1 provides intuition for this result; the figure traces out the 
“Engle curves” for i’s optimal level of Y, with  i Y−  held constant.   There are two ways to increase 
                                                 
4 The assumption  (,, ) (,, ) ia i ia i fa e fa e δ δ′ > would also have relevance in a model of pure warm glow, however.  
In that case 1 ie ia f f −= and so imposing the first inequality in Assumption 1 leads directly to the second 
inequality holding.    11
disposable income while holding  i Y−  constant:  increase ω  or decrease τ .  Panel A shows that as ω  
grows and disposable income rises, the Engle curves for less diverse communities are steeper (which is 
true by the second inequality in Assumption 1), and since all curves expand from the same point it 
follows that at any positive level of disposable income, and for any  i Y−  and  i τ , f will be higher for less 
diverse communities—and thus  0 i f δ < .  Panel B shows that as τ  falls (which corresponds to moving 
from right to left along the x axis), the increase in f is steeper in less diverse communities (which is true 
by the first inequality in Assumption 1), again ensuring that higher levels of  i δ  have lower levels of  i f , 
all else equal. 
The model’s assumption that the solution is interior as disposable income goes to zero plays a key 
role in this result.  In the context of Figure 1, interiority ensures that all Engle curves expand from the 
same point.  This assumption would generally be untrue in a model of pure altruism.  However, it can be 
maintained by assuming that no matter how small is disposable income, the individual will be willing to 
get at least some warm glow by spending money on  i g .  Such an assumption is analogous to Ribar and 
Wilhelm’s (2002) assumption that the joy of giving is “strictly operative.” 
  The fact that  i f δ  is negative yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 1:  Suppose a community grows more diverse so that  i δ  increases for all i.  Then the 
equilibrium level of the public good will fall. 
The model’s implication for the relationship between diversity and public-good provision is thus in 
accordance with prior empirical research—all else equal, more diverse communities have lower levels of 
public good provision.   
3C. Crowd-out 
   While Assumption 1 has clear implications of how diversity affects the amount of the public 
good provided in equilibrium, its implications for how diversity affects the strength of warm glow are 
ambiguous.  To see this, consider as a measure of the dominance of warm glow in the model  ia ie f f + ,   12












; higher levels of  ia ie f f +  thus correspond to a stronger role for warm glow.  In the 
extreme case where giving is driven entirely by the warm glow,  1 ia ie ff + = ; an increase in  i Y−  has no 
impact on individual’s i’s decision.  Notice that the two inequalities in Assumption 1 show that diversity 
pushes  ia ie f f +  in opposite directions.  If diversity works primarily by affecting warm glow, changes in 
ie f  will dominate and diversity will increase the sum  ia ie f f + .  If diversity works primarily through 
altruistic tastes for the public good, changes in  ia f  will dominate and  ia ie f f +  will fall as diversity 
grows. 
  To bring this into a discussion of equilibrium outcomes, consider two equilibrium outcomes A 
and B, where 
A B δ δ < . Let  (,, )
A AA A
ie ie i i i i ff Y Y ω τδ −− =+ + , where 
* A
ij j ji Yg τ − ≠ = + ∑  in equilibrium 
outcome A , and similarly let  (,, )
A AA A
ia ia i i i i ff Y Y ω τδ −− =+ +.  Analogous definitions hold for  
B
ie f  and 
B
ia f .  We will use the following definitions to encapsulate diversity’s impact on the relevance of warm 
glow: 
Definition:  Consider two equilibrium outcomes A and B, where 
A B δ δ < . We say 
(A) Warm glow is increasing with diversity if 
A ABB
ia ie ia ie f fff +<+ for each individual i. 
(B) Warm glow is decreasing in diversity if 
A ABB
ia ie ia ie f fff +>+ for each individual i. 
Suppose the government increases taxes and uses the revenue to provide more of the public good.  






 represent the 
equilibrium change in the public good in response to this intervention.  The following proposition relates 
the impact of diversity on warm glow to crowd-out: 
Proposition 2:  Consider two equilibrium outcomes A and B, where 
A B δ δ < , 
A B
ia ia f f > , and 
A B
ie ie f f < .     13
(A) If warm glow is increasing with diversity, then crowd-out will be smaller in the equilibrium with 








(B) If warm glow is decreasing with diversity, then crowd-out may either be larger or smaller in the 
equilibrium with greater diversity. 
Proposition 2 shows diversity’s impact on the public good is ambiguous.  If diversity works by “heating 
up” individuals’ warm glows, then all else equal more diverse communities will have less crowd-out than 
relatively homogeneous communities.  Individuals will be relatively unresponsive to changes in the 
government’s provision of the public good, because they do not view the government’s provision as 
substitutable with their own. Intriguingly, in this case diverse communities have the lowest levels of 
public goods but will be the communities where government intervention is most effective.   
If diversity works by “cooling off” the warm glow, however, then the impact of diversity is 
ambiguous.  The ambiguity comes from the fact that the government raises the revenue to provide the 
public good through taxation, and as the government raises taxes on individual 1 he will unambiguously 
be less responsive to this crowd-out in a more diverse equilibrium. Other individuals will in this case be 
more responsive to a change in government provision, and it is unclear in general which effect will 
dominate.  
3D. Corner Solutions 
  The above ambiguity is resolved if the increased government funds are taken from a non 
contributor.  Until now we have supposed that all individuals give to the public good.  Suppose now, 
however, that individual n + 1 in the community donates nothing to the public good in equilibrium.  
Consider an increase in the government’s provision of the public good that is financed by taxing this 
individual.  Then we have the following: 
Proposition 3   Consider two equilibrium outcomes A and B, where 
A B δ δ < , 
A B
ia ia f f > , and 
A B
ie ie f f < .  
Suppose the government increases provision of the public good by taxing a non-contributor. Then:    14
(A) If warm glow is increasing with diversity, then crowd-out will be smaller in the equilibrium with 










(B) If warm glow is decreasing with diversity, then crowd-out will be larger in the equilibrium with 










  While propositions 2 and 3 are based on the assumption that diversity lowers levels of altruism, it 
should be clear that a similar ambiguity would hold if the opposite were true and diversity increased 
altruism.  Thus, the basic conflict between altruism and warm glow would hold even in a “hot glow” 
model where diversity heated up warm glows.  The ambiguity of the model also works the other way—
factors which increase (or decrease) the efficacy of government intervention will in general have an 
ambiguous impact on the level of altruism in a community. 
The model here also has implications for Ribar and Wilhelm’s argument.  As mentioned earlier, 
Ribar and Wilhelm show that under certain conditions the warm glow effect should dominate individuals’ 
incentives in large communities, and crowd-out should therefore become negligible.  But a number of 
studies find large crowd-out even though the relevant populations are likely quite large (e.g., Payne, 1998; 
and Hungerman, 2005).  If as a community grows its characteristics change, then changes in warm glow 
may counteract the asymptotic result in their paper.  Intuitively, it may not only be the “quantity,” but the 
“quality,” of individuals in a community that matters as a community grows larger. 
The model here might also have implications where public goods are jointly provided by two 
different levels of government, rather than by the government and individuals.  Prior research has shown 
that local governments may be sensitive to community demographics and thus the impact of a centralized 
government’s intervention could vary by local community characteristics.  That is, the “flypaper effect” 
might vary based on local community diversity. I discuss extending this model to flypaper concerns more 
in the conclusion.   15
The theoretical ambiguity outlined by the model suggests that the relationship between diversity 
and crowd-out is an empirical matter.  The next section empirically investigates differences in crowd-out 
between different homogeneous and diverse communities. 
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
4A.  Data 
  This section empirically examines how diversity and crowd-out are related in one particular 
situation.  I follow Hungerman (2005) and compare the charitable activities of religious organizations to 
means-tested government payments.  The data on altruistic activities comes from a large dataset on 
charitable activities undertaken by United Methodist Church (UMC) congregations.  This is the third 
largest denomination in the country; the data consist of roughly 20,000 churches each year, from 1984 to 
2000.  Adherence is strong in all areas, and congregations are located in most counties (2,940) in the 
United States.  The widespread nature of this denomination will be valuable in this study.  The data have 
not been used in research before.   
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for congregations and local community characteristics.  
Per-member charitable church spending will be the dependent variable in the analysis.  Similar to Gruber 
and Hungerman (2007), this variable captures all spending by a congregation beyond operating expenses 
such as pastor’s salaries, capital expenses, supplies, and utilities.  The mean of the variable is fairly large; 
about $190 per member (all monetary amounts are in year 2000 dollars), although average total church 
expenditures (including operating expenses) are considerably larger, about $500 per member.  To the 
extent that this variable captures spending on projects unrelated to local means-tested government 
spending (such as spending on international causes) the resulting estimates will be biased towards zero. 
The UMC data contain information on county of location for each community, and the table 
shows relevant county-level controls included in the regressions.
5  A number of variables controlling for 
                                                 
5 As in other past research on churches (Pepall et al., 2007; Hungerman 2005) the county is the measure of 
community used.  Hungerman (2007) compares county and census tract measures of communities in an analysis of   16
economic conditions in a community are included, such as the share of the population made up of 
impoverished children (a “child” is below the age of 18), unemployment compensation, and the share of 
households headed by a single female.  Following Vigdor (2002), racial shares in levels will be included 
on the right hand side.  A number of variables controlling for the age distribution are also included.  
County population will be controlled for using a set of 10 dummy variables; one for each population 
decile. Year dummies will also be included. 
The demographic data are taken from the decennial Censuses and are linearly interpolated across 
years.  The SSI and unemployment data, which include state and federal payments, are taken from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).   
The key type of government spending to be used is Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
spending.  SSI is a national, means-tested program for blind, elderly, and disabled individuals.  As of the 
year 2000 (the end of the period of analysis), SSI was the largest federal means-tested cash-assistance 
program in the United States (Daly and Burkhauser, 2003). 
We will estimate following equation  
         * ict ct ct ct ct ict i t ict y ssi diversity diversity ssi X γ λ δ βθφε =+ + + + + +  (6) 
Where  ict y  is per-member spending on local charitable activities by congregation i in county c in year t,  
diversity is a measure of a community’s diversity, ssi is per-capita county expenditures on SSI, ict X  is a 
set of church and community specific controls,  i θ  is a church fixed effect,  t φ  is a year fixed effect, and 
ict ε  is noise.  The coefficient of interest isγ , which measures how the relationship between government 
SSI payments and charitable church activity depends on community diversity. 
The measure of diversity used will be the basic race Herfhindahl index, 
2 1 j jshare −∑ , where 
sharej is the share of a county’s population that is made up by racial group j. (Qualitatively similar results 
to the ones shown here are obtained by using alternate measures of diversity, such as percent black  in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
diversity and charitable activity and finds that both produce similar results.  Similarly, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
(1999) find similar results when comparing the effect of diversity on city, county, and metropolitan-level outcomes.   17
community).  The index is the standard measure of diversity in the literature (as discussed in Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2005) and can be interpreted as the likelihood that two individuals drawn from the same 
community are of different racial backgrounds.  The racial categories used are Asian/Pacific Islander, 
black, Native American, white and other.  While this construction of the index is common in the 
literature, one may argue that Hispanic should constitute a unique racial group.  Appendix Table A1 
shows that the results are essentially the same regardless of whether Hispanic is included in the index. 
4B. Identification. 
If unobserved phenomena cause correlation between government SSI spending and charitable 
church spending, then the estimates of γ  and δ may be biased.  To instrument for government spending, 
the regressions will exploit a 1990 Supreme-Court ruling that mandated an expansion of SSI program to 
certain groups of low-income children.   
Originally, children made up only a small fraction of the SSI caseload.  But a Supreme Court 
decision in the case of Sullivan v. Zebley expanded eligibility criteria for children, essentially by 
mandating that their eligibility criteria be made comparable to the criteria used for adults.  The ruling 
established an Individual Functional Assessment (IFA) of child applicants which could be used to verify 
that an applicant was disabled. As Daly and Burkhauser explain, “by allowing applicants who did not 
meet the medical listing [eligibility criteria] to be found disabled if their impairments were severe enough 
to limit their ability to engage in age-appropriate activities, such as attending school, the IFA lowered the 
level of severity required for children to be eligible for SSI benefits” (pg 91).   
The impact of the Zebley decision on child enrollment in SSI was dramatic.  The number of SSI 
child recipients more than tripled between 1989 and 1995 (Social Security Administration, 2006a).  In 
1996, more than $5 billion was paid in SSI benefits to over a million children (Loprest, 1997).
6    The 
population of children on the program is therefore sizeable, and the benefits these children were eligible 
                                                 
6 More than two-thirds of children on SSI qualify because of a mental disorder; the greatest proportion of this group 
is made up of mentally retarded children.  Diseases of the nervous system also make up a sizeable share (about 10 
percent) of recipients; see Social Security Administration, (2006b).   18
for was sizable as well.  In 1996, SSI provided up to $484 in monthly assistance; the median family with 
a child on SSI had total annual income of about $14,000 (Loprest, 1997).  
Figure 2 shows the growth in average per-capita SSI spending.  The solid line depicts average 
per-capita county SSI payments for churches in the sample across time.  There is a slight upward trend in 
SSI payments prior to the Zebley decision, but a clear and sharp increase in payments afterwards.   
Moreover, the post 1991 growth of SSI corresponds to a similarly strong increase in the share of SSI 
recipients who were children.  As shown in Figure 3, which is based on SSA data, the percent of SSI 
recipients below age 18 was essentially flat before the Zebley decision, and grew sharply after that until 
1996 (the plateau following 1996 will be discussed more below).  Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate the significant impact that the Zebley decision had on child enrollment in SSI and the SSI 
program more generally. 
It is possible that families affected by this ruling may have responded with changes in adult labor 
market outcomes, offsetting the financial benefits provided by the program. Also, SSI eligibility may 
have led to changes in eligibility or take-up of other programs, in particular Medicaid (for which most SSI 
recipients are categorically eligible).  A recent paper by Duggan and Kearney (2005) considers these 
issues.  They find that the net benefits of a family’s child enrolling in SSI are substantial—enrollment is 
associated with a nearly $2000 increase in total household income over a four month period.  They also 
find a modest impact of SSI enrollment on a child’s Medicaid eligibility; this will be discussed more in 
the next section.  They also find that a child’s SSI enrollment has little impact on family structure (e.g., 
parents’ marital status). 
States may also have responded to the court ruling by changing the generosity of their own SSI 
programs.  But while states have the ability to administer their own programs supplementing federal SSI 
payments, “a number of factors minimize the importance of these programs” (Daly and Burkhauser, 2003, 
pg 97).  Many states only supplement SSI payments to small fractions of recipients, such as certain   19
recipients living in institutions.
7  Also, most state supplements make up a small share of total SSI 
payments, with the federal government’s contributions exceeding state supplementation by roughly an 
order of magnitude (cf. Table 2 in Social Security Administration, 2004).  Additionally, most 
supplemental benefits follow the same rules as federal benefits and are in fact administered by the Federal 
Government.  Furthermore, the regressions include church-level dummies, which would subsume state-
level dummies and thus control for persistent variation in SSI administration across states.  All of this 
suggests that changes in state-level administration of SSI will not significantly affect the analysis.   
One might also wonder whether SSI is disproportionately used by minority children, which might 
lead to the post 1991 expansion being concentrated in high-minority (and also diverse) areas.  Data on the 
racial makeup of children on SSI are difficult to acquire.
8  However, Scott (1999) provides evidence that 
as of 1998 about 41% of the children on SSI where white.  This estimate is reasonably close to the Census 
Bureau’s own estimate that 45% of all impoverished individuals were white in 1999 (Table 6 in Bishaw 
and Iceland, 2003).  One might thus expect the Zebley decision to have similar impacts both in largely 
white communities and in more diverse communities, all else equal. 
Of course, the Census Bureau’s estimate also points out that if diverse communities are often 
high-minority, they might be expected to be poorer than other communities, all else equal, and this may 
affect charitable church activities.  The analysis here responds to this fact in four ways.  First, fixed 
effects are used, which will address persistent economic conditions across communities.  Second, a 
number of controls for economic conditions will be included in the regressions.  Third, given the use of 
fixed effects the identification strategy compares the change in church activity after 1991 in communities 
with many poor children to other communities.  Thus, only a change in the relationship between 
unobservables and race coincident with the Supreme Court’s decision could impact the estimates. Fourth, 
controls for race will be included in all regressions, and the results shown below are similar if racial 
controls are removed from the set of regressors.  This suggests that a time varying relationship between 
race and unobservables does not drive the results.   
                                                 
7 Only about 5% of child SSI recipients live in institutions (Powers, 2002). 
8 See Scott (1999) for a discussion of the difficulties.     20
The expansion of SSI to children was curtailed to some extent by the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also known as the 1996 welfare 
reform.  As described by the Social Security Administration (2006a), the welfare reform law ended the 
use of IFA, changed the way maladaptive behaviors were considered in determining eligibility, and 
mandated that individuals on SSI turning 18 have their eligibility re-determined. These changes restricted 
eligibility for children, although the criteria for eligibility were still more lenient than before the Zebley 
decision.   
  Normally, one might regard such a law change as valuable for purposes of identification.   
Indeed, Hungerman (2005) exploits the passage of the 1996 welfare reform law to study crowd-out 
between means-tested government spending and charitable spending by a group of Presbyterian 
congregations.  However, to study differences in crowd-out between homogeneous and diverse 
communities, the 1996 reform poses a number of challenges.  The law restricted non-citizen access to a 
number of means-tested programs, including SSI, Medicaid, AFDC (now TANF), and especially Food 
Stamps.  Since highly non-citizen communities are more likely to be diverse than are other communities; 
the impact of the reform was different in the two types of communities.  This complicates comparisons 
across communities of crowd-out estimates derived from this law; it is hard to say whether resultant 
differences are from differential changes in altruism or from differential changes in government activity.  
The results shown below consequently do not use the welfare law for identification.  Also, the regressions 
shown below are robust to removing post-1996 observations from the data, suggesting that the results are 
not being driven by the welfare reform law.  
Finally, there is evidence that congregations—and in particular Methodist congregations—are 
willing to partner with government programs such as SSI which provide support for disadvantaged or 
disabled youth and adults.  The 1988 Book of Discipline for the United Methodist Church states that “We 
affirm the responsibility of the Church and society to be in ministry with all persons, including those 
persons with mentally, physically, and/or psychologically handicapping conditions” (pg 72) (United 
Methodist Church, 1988a).  In 1988, the General Conference of the United Methodist Church considered   21
a resolution providing information on the needs of poor children, including information on the needs of 
poor handicapped children.  The resolution stated that United Methodist churches “seek a creative 
partnership with national government agencies concerned with children, including utilization of federal 
funds and services” and that “a coordinated ministry that reaches out to join with the health services, 
mental health and professional community is needed in every local area.”  The resolution also directly 
addresses the potential for crowd-out of local church activities: “the funds from the public sector have 
been greatly reduced over the past few years; thus there is a need for local churches and annual 
conferences to advocate for increased funding from the church and the government for these institutional 
ministries of the church” (pg D-1-7) (United Methodist Church, 1988b) 
In sum, the court-mandated expansion of the SSI program created a large and widespread 
increase in the largest federal means-tested cash-transfer program in the United States.  Research suggests 
that families’ strategic responses to SSI’s expansion were minimal, and that states’ ability to respond to 
the expansion by altering their own SSI programs was limited.  Work also suggests that the expansion did 
have significant impacts on the resources available to families with children newly eligible for SSI.  There 
is also evidence that Methodist congregations care about the wellbeing of needy children and that 
Methodists were responsive to funds from “the public sector” that supplemented the ministries of the 
church for the poor and disabled.  All of this suggests that the identification strategy is sound. 
4C.  Results 
This subsection reports estimates from 2SLS regressions where the key endogenous variables are 
per-capita SSI spending and per-capita SSI spending interacted with a racial Herfindahl index.  Two 
instruments are used to identify these variables. The first instrument is an interaction variable between the 
share of the population made up of impoverished children times a dummy that equals unity from 1991 
onwards. The instrument thus captures the fact that per-capita SSI spending will rise relatively more in 
communities with large shares of poor children after the court ruling.  The second instrument is a triple 
interaction between (a) the share of the population made up of impoverished children (b) a post-1990 
dummy and (c) the race Herfindahl index.     22
  Figure 4 provides a simple graphical illustration of the regression results to come.  The figure 
depicts two lowess-curve estimates of the relationship between (a) the fraction of a county’s population 
made up of poor individuals under 18 and (b) the difference in average charitable spending in each county 
after 1991 relative to before 1991.  One curve is for counties with below-average Herfindahl index values 
(low-diversity counties); the other curve is for counties with above-average values.  Consistent with 
crowd-out, both curves slope down, showing less spending growth in areas where the Zebley decision had 
a strong impact.  But the low diversity curve is consistently steeper, indicating a larger effect in these 
counties.   
  The regression results will indicate whether the intuition of the figure holds up to a more rigorous 
analysis.  Table 2 shows the basic regression results; all regressions report robust standard errors clustered 
by county and the year 1990 (when the Supreme Court decision was made) is dropped from the analysis.  
The uninteracted SSI term is negative and significant, suggesting that as per-capita SSI spending 
increases charitable church spending falls.  The coefficient implies that a one-dollar increase in SSI 
spending will crowd-out about 52 cents of per-member charitable church spending in a county with zero 
diversity.  For the average county (whose index is 0.23), the estimated response is 31 cents—a result that 
is reasonably close to the baseline estimate in Hungerman (2005), a paper using different data and a 
different identification strategy.  Table 7.A4 of the Social Security Administration (1997) shows that from 
1991 to 1995 annual SSI spending was on average $7 billion above its 1990 level.  If the UMC 
congregation estimates can be taken as representative of other religious adherents (which make up about 
half the population) a 31-cent member response is similar to a 15-cent per-capita response.  Thus, the rise 
in SSI spending over this period would have crowded-out roughly a billion dollars annually in charitable 
church activity.   
However, the interaction between SSI spending and the Herfindahl index is positive and 
significant, suggesting that high values of the index (that is, diverse counties) have crowd-out closer to 
zero.  The largest value obtained by the index in the sample is 0.7; thus for the most diverse communities 
the point estimate is wrong signed and close to zero.  The regression indicates that crowd-out is being   23
driven only by relatively homogeneous communities.  Turning to the other coefficients, the uninteracted 
race Herfindahl is negative, suggesting that charitable activity is lower in more diverse communities, all 
else equal.  Church activity is higher in communities with large shares of poor children, and church 
activity is higher in areas with relatively large shares of children or the elderly.  Consistent with prior 
research, the estimates show charitable activities are lower in larger congregations. 
  The next two columns show the first stage regressions.  The regression on SSI spending shows 
that both instruments are clearly significant, with the triple interaction term negative.  The simple-
interaction instrument suggests that if a county population’s share of impoverished children increased by 
a standard deviation (0.025), then that county would consequently expect about a $25 larger increase in 
post-1990 per-capita SSI spending, all else equal.  The triple interaction term says this post-1990 increase 
would be about $3.65 smaller if the county’s Herfindahl index were a standard deviation larger (the 
standard deviation for the index is 0.18).   Thus, SSI spending grew in areas with relatively large shares of 
poor children following the Zebley decision, although this growth was slightly smaller in more diverse 
areas. A Wald test that the sum of the two instruments equals zero can be rejected at the one-percent 
level; and even if the Herfindahl index were to equal unity, implying infinite diversity, the two 
instruments together still suggest a positive and economically significant impact of the Zebley decision on 
SSI spending.  The final column shows the first-stage regression on the interaction of SSI spending and 
the race Herfindahl.  Again, both instruments are significant and now both are positive.   
  Table 2 therefore suggests that crowd-out does vary by community diversity, with diverse 
communities being more amenable to government intervention than are other communities.  The 
difference in crowd-out between the two communities is economically significant; the average 
community has reasonably large crowd-out while the most diverse communities have no crowd-out at all.   
  Table 3 presents some robustness tests of the basic 2SLS regression.  The first column is taken 
from Table 2.  The next column reports an OLS regression; the uninteracted coefficient on SSI spending 
is much smaller than before and the interacted coefficient is slightly smaller than before.  The positive 
bias of OLS is consistent with a story where unobservables (such as community neediness) lead to a   24
spurious positive correlation in church charitable spending and SSI.  However, the size of the interacted 
coefficient suggests that this bias is not significantly different across different types of communities.     
  The third column of Table 3 does not include church (or county) fixed effects; the variation in 
SSI and race driving these results is therefore quite different than the variation driving the baseline 
estimates.  The coefficients are strikingly similar to those in the baseline regression; the result provides 
strong evidence of the quality of the identification strategy.  The last column uses per-member church 
operating expenses as the key dependent variable (these include for example payments on upkeep, 
insurance, supplies and utilities).  The uninteracted coefficient is positive and marginally significant; 
consistent with a story where churches may increase current expenses when their charitable spending has 
been crowded-out.  The uninteracted coefficient is much smaller than before and is insignificant.   
  As discussed in the prior subsection, one potential concern about this result is that it excludes 
other government spending that might also crowd-out church spending.  Table 4 addresses this and other 
concerns.  The first column repeats the basic regression of Table 2, except that other means-tested per-
capita government spending, including spending on Medicaid, Food Stamps, and AFDC/TANF, are 
included on the right-and side as a control (the spending data for these programs come from the BEA).  
The estimated coefficients are extremely similar to before.   
  The second column uses all four means-tested programs together as the relevant measure of 
government spending.  Again the qualitative result is the same—as spending on SSI, Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, and AFDC/TANF rises, charitable church spending falls, but only in relatively homogeneous 
communities.  The decrease in the coefficients’ size between this result and the baseline result in Table 2 
is driven by an increase in the size of the coefficients on the instruments in the first stage (since the 
reduced-form regression is the same).  The increase in the instrument size suggests that the increase in 
SSI from the Zebley decision increased spending in these other programs, which is not surprising since 
SSI eligibility is in some cases mechanically linked to eligibility for Medicaid and Food Stamps.  In 
particular, the sizeable increase in the first-stage coefficients on the instruments is likely driven by 
Medicaid; a program which is both relatively large and relatively less likely to substitute for church   25
activities than are the other three programs.  The third column in Table 4 repeats the regression of column 
2 but this time government spending is only SSI, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamps.  The result is once 
more extremely close to the original estimation.  
  One might be concerned that the interacted coefficients estimated thus far have been affected by 
constraining the relationship between diversity and crowd-out to be linear with respect to the Herfindahl 
index.  A solution to this would be to create dummy variables for different levels of diversity, and interact 
them with government spending.  The last three regressions shown in Table 4 interact government 
spending with two dummy variables measuring diversity:  the first dummy equals unity if a county’s 
Herfindahl index is greater than 0.2 and less than 0.4 (these communities are “in-between” diversity and 
homogeneity) and the second dummy equals unity for communities with an index value above 0.4 
(diverse communities).  (The regressions also include uninteracted dummies for in-between and diverse 
counties.)  A covariate for government spending without any interactions is also included; its coefficient 
thus captures crowd-out in racially homogeneous communities.
9 
  Figure 5 shows a histogram of the distribution of diversity across churches in the sample.  On top 
of the histogram is smoothed-out kernel estimate of the density of diversity. There is a spike to the left, 
representing a large share of observations in relatively homogeneous communities.  There is also a small 
but long right tail.  The two dummy variables constructed here each represent about a quarter of the 
sample, with the “in-between” dummy making up the 3
rd quartile and the diverse dummy making up the 
4
th quartile.  Given the spike to the left of this figure, combining the first two quartiles together seems 
intuitive.
10  
  As seen in Table 4, the results are qualitatively similar in this case, regardless of whether only 
SSI, all types of means-tested spending, or all types of means-tested spending but Medicaid are included.  
The coefficient for the in-between dummy*government spending is in all cases positive and significant, 
                                                 
9 There are three excluded instruments for these 2SLS regressions.  The first instrument is the standard one, share of 
poor children in a county times a post 1990 dummy.  The second instrument is an interaction of the standard 
instrument and a dummy for whether a county is an “in-between” community.  The final instrument is an interaction 
of the standard instrument and a dummy for whether a county is a diverse community.   
10 Indeed, breaking the first two quartiles apart does not qualitatively change these estimates.   26
suggesting that moderately homogeneous counties have less crowd-out than the most homogeneous 
communities and the difference between the two types of counties is significant.  The interaction with the 
heterogeneous dummy is even more positive and significant, suggesting even less crowd-out in the most 
heterogeneous communities.    The size of the coefficients is also economically significant.  Extrapolating 
to other denominations, the estimates in the last column of Table 4 suggest 20 cents on the dollar crowd-
out in homogeneous communities but only 5 cents on the dollar in diverse communities.  For each of the 
last three regressions, a Wald test that the three coefficients are equal can be rejected.
11  Overall, these 
results again suggest that crowd-out is smaller—and close to zero—in diverse communities.  
  The results in Table 4 constrain all the coefficients besides government spending to be the same 
across homogeneous and diverse communities.  It may be the case that these coefficients are in reality 
different across different communities, and the results from Table 4 are consequently biased.  To address 
this concern, Table 5 repeats the regression from Table 4, but now each sample—homogeneous counties, 
in-between counties, and heterogeneous counties—is regressed separately.   
  The first row of the table shows the 2SLS results; each coefficient is from a 2SLS regression on 
charitable church spending.  Homogeneous counties show clear crowd-out, the magnitude is the same as 
in Table 4.  The point estimate for in-between counties is similar and slightly smaller in absolute value.  
The coefficient for heterogeneous counties is much smaller and insignificant.  Again, the results suggest 
that crowd-out is driven by homogeneous and somewhat homogeneous counties. 
  Are these results driven by the first stage regressions?  If the expansion of SSI mattered only in 
homogeneous counties, then an insignificant first-stage coefficient for in-between counties and a wrong-
signed first stage for heterogeneous counties could explain the 2SLS results.  But the next row of Table 5 
shows that this is not the case.  This row shows the coefficient for the instrument from first stage 
regressions for each sample.  While the coefficient is largest for homogeneous counties, the first stage is 
reasonably sized and very significant for all of the samples.  The third row of the table shows the reduced-
form estimates, clearly depicting a steady decline in church reaction to communities with large shares of 
                                                 
11 The table also shows that Wald tests can reject that the coefficient on the spending*in-between dummy equals the 
coefficient on the spending*diverse dummy in each regression.   27
poor children after 1991.  Together, the results in rows two and three show that the 2SLS estimates are 
not simply being driven by differences in the first stage.  The last three rows of the table repeat the 
robustness tests from Table 4.  Adding other means-tested spending to the right-hand side, using all 
means-tested spending as the regressor of interest, or using all spending but Medicaid does not change the 
results.    
  Overall then, the results here suggest that government spending during this period had a 
reasonably large crowd-out effect on church spending.  However, the results are quite different in 
homogeneous versus diverse communities, with crowd-out being driven only by homogeneous and 
somewhat homogeneous counties and not by diverse counties.   
  
Conclusions 
  This paper explores whether governments can counteract diversity’s impact on altruistic 
behavior; the findings show that, with regards to the particular policy change studied here, diverse 
communities were significantly more amenable to government expansion than were homogeneous 
communities.  The estimates here of crowd-out for the average community are reasonably large, and show 
a sizable disparity in crowd-out between homogeneous and diverse communities.  Some other crowd-out 
studies, such as Payne (1998), also find sizeable crowd-out estimates; crowd-out in those situations might 
also reflect significant differences across communities.   
A key result of this study is that crowd-out can vary by community characteristics,  a concept 
which has been overlooked by most prior work despite the significant empirical differences in crowd-out 
that are manifest in the literature.  While this paper focused on the relationship between crowd-out and 
diversity, it should be clear that the basic idea of the model could be applied to any factors affecting 
incentives to voluntarily provide public goods.  This work on crowd-out could also help shed light on 
whether the relative importance of warm-glow incentives over altruistic incentives changes in different 
situations, an issue raised by Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007).  Whether other phenomena besides 
diversity play salient roles in determining crowd-out remains to be seen.   28
A second key result of this study is that crowd-out may involve issues of equity, and not just 
efficiency: similarly-implemented policies can lead to different levels of public goods across 
communities.  Given the size of the coefficients here, it seems likely that variation in crowd-out could 
lead to economically significant discrepancies in the provision of many different public goods across 
different communities.  A serious analysis of the welfare effects of inequitable crowd-out would need to 
carefully consider how social welfare is best modeled in the presence of a warm glow; a topic for which 
there is little consensus (cf. Diamond, 2006).  Developing an appropriate methodology for studying the 
equity implications of crowd-out is an important topic for future research. 
Moreover, the (non-experimental) crowd-out literature has for some time focused on the question 
of whether crowd-out is one-for-one.  It is reasonable at this point to conclude that in almost all 
circumstances crowd-out is not one-for-one, and there is significant empirical and theoretical evidence at 
this point showing that the models related to Warr (1982) give unreliable predictions.  Hopefully the work 
of this paper shows that empirical variation in crowd-out and the conceptual challenges of studying 
efficiency and equity in the warm-glow model constitute important unresolved issues in the literature. 
Finally, as discussed in the theoretical section, this study may have implications for work in other 
areas.  Steinberg (1991) notes that there are theoretical connections between the crowd-out literature and 
the literature on the flypaper effect.  The model as presented here, however, takes government 
intervention as exogenous.  While such an assumption is consistent with past crowd-out work and is 
sensible here given the focus of the empirical section, endogenous government decisions often play an 
important role in flypaper effect stories, as Knight (2002) argues.  Whether community characteristics 
lead to variation in the effect of inter-government transfers remains to be seen.   29
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Consider a decrease in endowed income  i ω  toward  i τ , so that disposable income falls towards 
zero.  By the budget constraint given in (2) and by the continuity of f, as  i ω  approaches  i τ  it must be the 
case that voluntary donations converge to zero.  Thus, for a given  ii Y τ − + , as  ii Y ω − +  falls towards 
ii Y τ − + , i’s chosen level of the public good falls to  ii Y τ − + .  Then for any given levels of  i Y− ,  i τ , and 
i δ ,  lim ( , , )
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where the terms () ii Y τ − +  in (A1) cancel out.  The two integrals in (A2) are over the same interval, and 
each function  ia f  is positive.  It follows by the second inequality in Assumption 1 that the expression in 
(A2) is positive.  Thus as δ  increases, all else constant,  i f  falls.  By the assumption of differentiability 
we have that  0 i f δ < . 
Consider next an increase in  i τ  towards its upper limit of  i ω , so that disposable income again 
falls towards zero.  Again by (2) and by the continuity of f it must be the case that voluntary donations 
converge to zero.  Thus for a given  ii Y ω − + , as  ii Y τ − +  rises towards  ii Y ω − + , i’s chosen level of the 
public good rises to  ii Y ω − + .  It follows that for any given levels of  i Y− ,  i ω , and  i δ , 
lim ( , , )
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Again let δ δ ′ > .  From (A3) we can write  (,, ) (,, ) ii i i i ii i i i fY Y fY Y ω τδ ω τδ −− −− ′ + +−+ +  as  











′ +− + ∫∫  (A4) 
By the first inequality in Assumption 1 the expression in (A4) is positive.  Thus as δ  increases, all else 
constant, again i f  falls.  Thus again we have that  0 i f δ < .   30
Proof of Proposition 1:  
Let  (,, ) ii ii ii i i i i y gf Y Y Y τ ωτ δ −− − =+= + + −.  Totally differentiate individual i’s donation 
function i y : 
 
*
ii a i i e i i i dy f dY f dY f d dY δ δ − −− =++ −  . 
Using the fact that ii dY dY dy − =−, solving for 
*
i dy  yields  
 
* 1 ia ie i
i




δ δ + −
=+
++
.    








ii ia ie ia ie
ff f dY





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +−
=− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑∑ .  
The terms summed in the rightmost set of parentheses all have a negative numerator and a positive 


















 for all i since  1 ia ie ff +< .  Thus  0.
dY
dδ
<    
Proof of Proposition 2:  
Define  i y  as in proposition 1; differentiating person 1’s donation function  1 y  yields: 
 
*
111 1 1 1 1 () ae dy f dY f dY d dY τ − −− =+ + −   
Substituting 
*
11 dY dY dy − =−, solving for 
*

















where  1111 /( ) aae f ff α =+ .  Solving out for all other individuals (holding their taxes constant) and 


















=− − = − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∑ . (A5) 
Consider case (A) in the proposition.  Since 
A B
ia ia f f >  and by the assumption that warm glow is 
increasing in diversity it follows that  11
A B α α > .  Looking at the first term, c, in (A5), we can again write   31












−+ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∑ .  Since by assumption 
A ABB
ia ie ia ie f fff +<+, it follows that 
A B cc < .









=− <− =. 
  In case (B) 
A B cc > ,  but  11
A B α α >  .  Thus it is unclear whether  ( ) 1 1
A A c α −  is greater or less 
than  () 1 1
BB c α − .   
Proof of Proposition 3. 

















=− − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∑ .  However, as discussed in Andreoni (1989), if the individual 





= , where c is defined as in (A5).  It follows for case 
(A) that 
A B cc <  as before.  Additionally, for case (B) it follows that  
A B cc > .   
                                                 

























. Thus as  ia ie f f + increases for all i, c will increase.    32
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Figure 1 
 





In Panel A, endowed income is rising along the x axis.  In Panel B, lump sum taxes are rising along the x axis.  Each 
panel shows “Engle curves” for how the optimal choice of Y changes as disposable income changes.   In both 
pictures δ δ ′ > . 
 
ii Y τ − +  
ii Y ω − +
(,, ) i f δ′ ⋅⋅  
(,, ) i f δ ⋅⋅
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Slope is  (1 ) ie f − −  
 
ii Y τ − +  
ii Y ω − +
(,, ) i f δ′ ⋅⋅  
(,, ) i f δ ⋅⋅
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Graph shows average county per-capita spending on SSI for the regression Sample.  Spending is in year 2000 dollars. 
   36
 








1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Zebley Decision
 
Table shows the percent of SSI recipients under the age of 18.  Source:  Social Security Administration (2004).   37
Figure 4:  Growth in Charitable Spending Following the Zebley Decision 
 
 
Figure depicts two lowess-curve estimates of the relationship between (a) the fraction of a county’s population made up of poor 
individuals under 18 and (b) the difference in average charitable spending after 1991 relative to before 1991.  The “low diversity” 
curve was calculated for counties having a below-average Herfindahl index score for diversity, the “high diversity” curve uses 













Figure presents a histogram and kernel-density estimate of distribution of Herfindahl index across sample.  
See text for description of Herfindahl index’s construction. 
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Table 1:   Summary Statistics 
 Mean 
Per-member charitable church spending  192 
 [128] 
Per-capita SSI Spending  97.5 
 [66.4] 
Racial Herfindahl index  0.228 
 [0.176] 
Share of population impoverished children  0.046 
 [0.025] 
Share of households headed by single female  0.148 
 [0.052] 
Unemployment compensation, per capita (1000s)  0.098 
 [0.062] 
Share county White  0.842 
 [0.156] 
Share county Black  0.117 
 [0.145] 
Share county American Indian  0.007 
 [0.025] 
Share county Asian/Pacific Islander  0.011 
 [0.027] 
Share county Hispanic  0.04 
 [0.085] 
Share county under age 5  0.069 
 [0.009] 
Share county ages 6-18  0.205 
 [0.02] 
Share county ages 65 and over  0.136 
 [0.036] 
County population (1000s)  296 
 [851] 
Small church dummy (<100 members)  0.314 
 [0.464] 
Medium-sized church dummy (100-500 members)  0.525 
 [0.499] 
Log of members  5.15 
 [1.06] 
Observations: 375,373.  Standard deviations in brackets.   Each church each year counts as one 
observation.  There are churches in 2,940 counties in the sample.  The sample covers UMC 
churches from 1984 to 2000.  Monetary figures in year 2000 dollars. 
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Table 2:  Diversity and Crowd-out:  
Selected Coefficients from Basic Regression 
 





Per-capita SSI spending  -0.522 
  [0.056] 
- - 
SSI spending*Race Herfindahl  0.860 
  [0.134] 
- - 








Race Herfindahl  -212.9  -48.8  -26.64 
  [117.2] [50.6] [27.67] 
Share poor children  280.7  68.48  -11.22 
  [132.3] [76.68] [26.41] 
Share single female-headed HHs  -274.6  139.2  60.29 
  [78.71] [52.41] [20.33] 
Unemployment compensation  -11.19  -0.128  2.44 
  [8.22] [5.23] [1.91] 
Share population under 5  958.3  118.5  113.6 
  [185] [108.3]  [34.97] 
Share population 6-18  190.3  -175.4  37.39 
  [98.84] [67.62] [21.42] 
Share population over 65  506.9  414.4  87.54 
  [87.92] [49.36] [16.98] 
Small church dummy  -12.87  1.08  0.266 
  [5.75] [0.47]  [0.157] 
Medium church dummy  -6.66  1.49  0.351 
  [3.34] [0.36]  [0.140] 
Log members  -92.23  -2.47  -1.10 
  [8.88] [0.51] [0.20] 
Dependent variable   Church 
Spending  SSI Spending  SSI Spending* 
Herfindahl 
Year & population dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Church  fixed  effects?  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared -  0.96 0.98 
Observations 375,373  375,373 375,373 
Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in brackets. The dependent variable in each column is 
different; see the table for details.  The “Triple interaction” variable interacts (a) Share poor children (b) 






Table 3: Robustness Tests on Charitable Church Spending 
 
  Baseline 2SLS 
Regression 
OLS Regression on 
Church Spending 
2SLS Regression  
w/out Church FEs 
2SLS Regression on 
Current Expenses 
Per-capita SSI spending  -0.522  -0.138  -0.627  0.060 
  [0.056] [0.031] [0.081] [0.037] 
SSI spending*Race Herfindahl  0.860 0.589 0.575 0.047 
  [0.134] [0.116] [0.145] [0.095] 
Year & population dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Church fixed effects?  Yes Yes No Yes 
Include regressors from Table 2?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  375,373  375,373 375,373 375,373 
All regressions except column 2 are 2SLS regressions.  Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in brackets.   The First three columns show 
regressions of per-member church spending on SSI.  The third column does not include church (or county) fixed effects.  The last column uses 
per-member current operating expenses as the dependent variable; current expenses include for example spending on upkeep, insurance, 
supplies and utilities. 
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Table 4: Additional 2SLS Regressions on Charitable Church Spending 
 














Per-capita government spending  -0.505  -0.084  -0.506  -0.422 -0.069 -0.394 
 [0.057]  [0.009]  [0.059]  [0.051] [0.009]  [0.05] 
Gov’t spending*Race Herfindahl  0.877  0.11  0.839  - - - 
 [0.136]  [0.014]  [0.104]     
Gov’t spending*In-between dummy  -  -  -  0.192  0.024  0.218 
       [0.062]  [0.006]  [0.046] 
Gov’t spending*Heterogeneous dummy -  -  -  0.314  0.039  0.309 
       [0.059]  [0.006]  [0.044] 




SSI,  Food Stamps, 




SSI,  Food Stamps, 
AFDC/TANF 
Year & population dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Church fixed effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include regressors from Table 2?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include middle & heterogeneous dums? No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  375,373  375,373 375,373 375,373  375,373 375,373 
All regressions are 2SLS regressions on charitable church spending, per member.  Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in brackets.  The “in-between” 
dummy equals unity if a county has a Herfindahl index value between 0.2 and 0.4, the heterogeneous dummy equals unity if the Herfindahl index is above 0.4.  The 
in-between dummy equals unity for 94,906 observations and the heterogeneous dummy is unity for 85,690 observations.  A Wald test that the spending*in-between 
dummy equals the spending*heterogeneous dummy in column 4 yields a test statistic of 
2[1] χ = 3.61, p = 0.057.  For column 5, a Wald test that the spending*in-
between dummy equals the spending*heterogeneous dummy yields 
2[1] χ = 7.00, p = 0.008. For column 6, a Wald test that the spending*in-between dummy 
equals the spending*heterogeneous dummy yields 
2[1] χ = 4.13, p = 0.042.  A Wald test that all three listed coefficients are equal is rejected at the one percent 
level for each regression in columns 4, 5, and 6.  The last three columns use three instruments: The first instrument is the standard one, share of poor children in a 
county times a post 1990 dummy.  The second instrument is an interaction of the standard instrument and a dummy for whether a county is an “in-between” 
community.  The final instrument is an interaction of the standard instrument and a dummy for whether a county is a diverse community. 
   43
Table 5: Diversity and Crowd-out: Separate Samples 
 






IV Regression of Church Spending on SSI     
  Per-capita SSI spending  -0.412  -0.366  -0.073 
 [0.051]  [0.124]  [0.107] 
      
First Stage Regression of SSI Spending on Instrument     
  Share impoverished children*Post 1990 dummy  1,095  422.1  581 
 [55.05]  [67.42]  [52.1] 
      
Reduced Form Regression of Church Spending on Instrument     
  Share impoverished children*Post 1990 dummy  -450.8  -154.6  -42.30 
 [47.11]  [52.98]  [60.94] 
      
IV: Church Spending on SSI w/other spending on RHS     
  Per-capita SSI spending  -0.39 -0.308  -0.118 
  [0.05] [0.134]  [0.119] 
      
IV: Church Spending on all  Means-Tested Spending     
  Per-capita government spending  -0.074  -0.049  -0.018 
 [0.009]  [0.017]  [0.026] 
      
IV: Church Spending on all Means-Tested Spending but Medicaid  -0.353 -0.228 -0.101 
  Per-capita government spending  [0.044]  [0.080]  [0.150] 
Year & population dummies?  Yes Yes Yes 
Church fixed effects?  Yes Yes Yes 
Include regressors from Table 2?  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 194,777  94,906  85,690 
Each coefficient is from a separate regression.  Per-capita SSI spending is the dependent variable for regressions in the second row; for all other 
regressions the dependent variable is per-member charitable church spending. Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in brackets.  The 
sample of homogeneous counties includes counties with Herfindahl index values below 0.2; the “in-between” sample includes counties with 
Herfindahl index values between 0.2 and 0.4, and the heterogeneous sample includes counties with Herfindahl index values above 0.4.  Per-capita 
government spending in the bottom row equals spending on SSI, Food Stamps, and AFDC/TANF.  Per-capita government spending on the next-
to-bottom row includes SSI, Food Stamps, AFDC/TANF, and Medicaid.   44
Table A1: Results Using Alternate Index Construction 














2SLS Reg. on 
Current 
Expenses 
Per-capita SSI spending  -0.561 -0.122  -0.629  0.085 
  [0.058] 
- - 
[0.032] [0.082] [0.040] 
SSI spending*Race Herfindahl  0.777 0.526  0.642  0.031 
  [0.132] 
- - 
[0.121] [0.198] [0.102] 




- - - 




- - - 
Observations: 375,373. Regressions are identical to those in Tables 2 and 3 except that the Herfindahl index for race includes Hispanic as a race.  See Tables 2 and 
3 and the bottom of this table for more details. 
 














Per-capita government spending  -0.556  -0.093  -0.524  -0.416  -0.069  -0.386 
  [0.060] [0.010] [0.059] [0.049] [0.008] [0.048] 
Gov’t spending*Race Herfindahl 0.782  0.105  0.769  -  -  - 
 [0.135]  [0.013]  [0.096]       
Gov’t spending*In-between dummy  -  -  -  0.164  0.020  0.192 
       [0.059]  [0.006]  [0.047] 
Gov’t spending*Heterogeneous dummy -  -  -  0.307  0.039  0.304 
      [0.057]  [0.006]  [0.042] 
Observations: 375,373.  Regressions are identical to those in Table 4 except that the Herfindahl index for race includes Hispanic as a race.  See Table 4 and the 
bottom of this table for more details.  The Wald tests described under Table 4 were conducted for these regressions and the resulting test statistics were very similar 
to those described under Table 4. 
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Table A1: Results Using Alternate Index Construction, continued 
From Table 5  






IV Regression of Church Spending on SSI     
  Per-capita SSI spending  -0.436  -0.564  -0.116 
 [0.054]  [0.135]  [0.108] 
      
First Stage Regression of SSI Spending on Instrument     
  Share impoverished children*Post 1990 dummy  1,055.71  500.71  557.54 
 [57.31]  [75.10]  [46.50] 
      
Reduced Form Regression of Church Spending on Instrument     
  Share impoverished children*Post 1990 dummy  -460.39  -282.45  -64.82 
 [47.57]  [56.47]  [59.27] 
      
IV: Church Spending on SSI w/other spending on RHS     
  Per-capita SSI spending  -0.424 -0.527 -0.154 
  [0.055] [0.146] [0.123] 
      
IV: Church Spending on all  Means-Tested Spending     
  Per-capita government spending  -0.077  -0.081  -0.027 
 [0.009]  [0.016]  [0.026] 
      
IV: Church Spending on all Means-Tested Spending but Medicaid  -0.371 -0.380 -0.156 
  Per-capita government spending  [0.047]  [0.091]  [0.148] 
Observations 181,589  91,571  102,213 
Regressions are identical to those in Table 5 except that the Herfindahl index for race includes Hispanic as a race.  See Table 5 and the bottom of this 
table for more details. 
 
The index is constructed as before except that individuals identifying themselves as Hispanic are classified in a new Hispanic category, and the 
proportion Hispanic is subsequently included in the index’s construction.  The mean of the index in the sample is 0.25, with a maximum value of 0.76.  
As before, the “in-between” dummy equals unity if a county has a Herfindahl index value between 0.2 and 0.4, and the heterogeneous dummy equals 
unity if the Herfindahl index is above 0.4.   
 